We describe some general relations between cryptographic and abstracted security de nitions, and we present a novel model of security for reactive systems, generalizing previous de nitions relying on the simulatability paradigm.
Introduction
Security proofs for systems involving cryptography are getting increasing attention in theory and practice, and they are used for increasingly large systems. While for some time most of the e ort concentrated on primitives like encryption and signature schemes themselves, or authentication and key exchange, currently work is under way on entire secure channels, fair exchange protocols, payment systems, and anonymity systems. In the future, one might want to prove even larger systems like entire electronic-commerce architectures, or distributed operating systems using cryptography.
Two communities are working on such proofs, and the techniques are almost completely disjoint. One of our goals with this paper is to show how to link them, and that one actually needs to link them to get the best possible overall results.
We will therefore start with a rather global introduction. More closely related literature is discussed in Section 2.
Abstracted Methods
In the formal-methods community, one tries to use established speci cation techniques to specify requirements and actual protocols unambiguously and with a clear semantics. Moreover, most work aims at proofs that are at least automatically veri able and if possible automatically constructed.
One always needs some security-speci c work, e.g., to model an adversary controlling the network and to formalize speci c security requirements in the given language. The earliest work on tool support was rather speci c, e.g., the Interrogator 28] and the NRL protocol veri er 25], while nowadays most work is based on standard languages like CSP, e.g., 36, 24] , or the -calculus 2] and general-purpose veri cation tools.
Where one aims at tool-supported proofs, cryptographic primitives are almost always abstracted from in a way introduced in 12]: 2 Each cryptographic operation is treated as a basic operation in an abstract data type or a term algebra. For instance, there is a pair of operators E X and D X for asymmetric encryption and decryption with a key pair of a participant X. The result of two encryptions of a message m from a basic message space M is not represented as another message from M, but as the term E X (E X (m)). One then de nes cancellation rules, in particular D X (E X (t)) = t for all terms t. A basic assumption for proofs in such a model is that equations that cannot be derived from the explicitly given ones do not hold. Hence, in terms of abstract data types, one works in an initial model of the given formulas. (This model not only underlies papers like the ones cited above, but also the semantics of BAN logic 3, 41] .)
In most other applications of formal methods, one does not restrict oneself to initial models, but in security, one needs them because one typically wants to show inequalities, e.g., that the set of messages an adversary can learn does not contain a certain secret message.
A problem with all these models is the missing link between the chosen abstractions and the real cryptographic primitives as de ned and sometimes proven in cryptography. Hence all the techniques, even actual proofs in the 2 Other approaches closer to cryptography are treated in Sections 1.6 and 2.1. abstraction (no restriction to a nite number of protocol executions etc.), are only a way of rapidly discovering some errors with respect to cryptographic reality. We will come back to this with small (and \made-up") examples after presenting a cryptographic de nition.
Cryptographic De nition of Asymmetric Encryption
For comparison with the abstraction above, let us present the cryptographic de nition of secure asymmetric encryption. It comprises adaptive chosenmessage attacks and secrecy of any partial information about the encrypted message. This is the strongest de nition considered in cryptography. Several di erent de nitions, both concerning partial information and active attacks, have all been proven equivalent 26, 6] . Hence cryptographers are quite satis ed to have captured the concept adequately. E cient systems provably secure in this strong sense under reasonable assumptions are known 11].
One de nes an encryption system as a triple of polynomial-time algorithms (gen, E, D), where gen and E are probabilistic. On input a security parameter k, gen outputs a key pair (sk; pk). E and D are encryption and decryption, and an equation denoting correct encryption is required as above, i.e., for all key pairs (sk; pk) from the range of gen, and all messages from a certain message space, D(sk; (E(pk; m)) = m.
For the security, one considers the following interaction between an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time interactive adversary A and an attacked participant Dec (\decryptor"), see Figure 1 . 3 Initially, the attacked participant generates a key pair and sends pk to A. The adversary may then ask Dec to decrypt chosen ciphertexts c j . At some point, A instead chooses two messages m 0 ; m 1 and Dec encrypts a randomly chosen one of them. The choice is indicated by a bit b, i.e., c = E(pk; m b ). 4 Then A may continue the chosen-ciphertext attack, except that Dec now refuses to decrypt the speci c Pfitzmann, Schunter and Waidner ciphertext c. Finally, A outputs a bit b as its guess at b.
The de nition is that the probabilities P A (k) that b = b for such an attacker A and the security parameter k should only be negligibly larger than 1/2. This is called the class \1/2 + 1/poly(k)". It means that for any polynomial Q there exists a parameter k 0 2 N such that for all k > k 0 , P A (k) 1 2 + 1 Q(k) : The probability is taken over all probabilistic choices of Dec and A, in particular the key generation, the probabilism in the encryption function and the adversary's probabilistic choices.
Comparison
Obviously, the de nition of asymmetric encryption in cryptography and its abstraction are not very similar. We do not even mainly mean obvious di erences like the explicit restriction to polynomial-time adversaries and the error probability 1=Q(k)|these are facts from which you might reasonably want to abstract. The main point is that this de nition makes no attempt to cover all inequalities that are assumed in the abstraction; it concentrates fully on knowledge about the cleartext given the ciphertext.
For example, a protocol might use a hash function H and attach H(m) to a message m for redundancy in an integrity check. Then tests of the form tail(m) = H(head(m)) occur, where tail extracts the end of the message of appropriate length for hash values and head takes the rest. Now consider the equation tail(E(m)) = H(head(E(m))): In the abstraction, one would certainly not add it to the model, because it does not hold for most encryption systems. Nevertheless, one can easily construct some cryptographically secure encryption systems where this equation always holds: Simply take any secure encryption system and augment all ciphertexts c by H(c). It is easy to see that this has no in uence on the security in the cryptographic sense: H(c) gives no new information about the encrypted message because it is a function of the ciphertext that the adversary knows anyway. This can be turned into a rigorous cryptographic proof without problems.
This example already shows that the abstract model is not necessarily faithful with respect to the cryptographic semantics of the primitives. We are not aware of a real protocol that fails for such reasons (but we have not searched), but one could make up arti cial ones that do. For instance, let us build a ve-message fair exchange protocol of a payment promise against something. 5 First, participant X signs a message m 1 that contains a special 5 Fair exchange means that either both parties should obtain the other's item or none. Here we sketch an optimistic protocol, where a third party can be called upon in incorrect protocol runs to restore fairness, typically if the last messages is not sent. 4 that he was supposed to send before m 5 for fairness. This problem will not be found in the abstract model. Of course, this is a stupid protocol, and we have not even worked it out fully. The goal is not to show that something is actually \wrong", but to point out that we have no guarantee that it is \right" in a certain sense that would be nice to have. This is shown in Figure 2 . The top layer shows the abstraction; there are protocols built from abstracted primitives and proven secure with respect to certain abstract goals. The abstract primitives represent concrete primitives, and there should be an unambiguous mapping for deriving a concrete protocol from the abstract one by replacing the primitives. (This is more or less clear in the models mentioned above, except for some logics of authentication.) We cannot expect the concrete protocol to ful l the abstract goals, as long as those abstract from error probabilities and computational restrictions on the adversary (which we nd a good thing). However, we would like it to ful l a concrete version of the goals which is automatically derived from the abstract one by adding similar error probabilities and computational restrictions. This part does not exist yet|neither the cryptographic semantics of general abstract goals, nor the proof that the abstract \ful ls"-relation implies the cryptographic one.
In the following subsections, we discuss previous approaches that can be seen in relation to the gray part of Figure 2 . We then present (as extended abstract) a model that lls some of the existing gaps. 5
Other Cryptographic De nitions Relating to Abstractions
For certain primitives the approach from the previous section has already been taken to some extent: Mere integrity primitives like signature schemes and symmetric authentication codes can be speci ed quite well in temporal logic, see 29]; such speci cations where also made in other contexts, in particular rst in 39]. The special point in 29, 31] is that a concrete cryptographic semantics for general linear temporal-logic formulas de ning safety properties was sketched (in a meta-model, not a concrete underlying machine model). It was shown that applying this model to certain primitives actually gives the cryptographic de nition, and that logic implications can be made and carry over to the cryptographic layer.
Another approach that can be interpreted as basing cryptographic denitions on abstract speci cations is the simulatability approach at de ning secure function evaluation. There, the abstract speci cation is simply a function f on many inputs x 1 ; : : : ; x n . The goal of the cryptographic protocol is that each participant provides one x i as secret input and they all learn the result y = f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), but no further information about the inputs of the other parties. It was quite an e ort to actually de ne what this means in a cryptographic sense, starting with 42], over approaches that tried to de ne the integrity and privacy of such protocols separately, back to formalizations that more closely resembled the original idea that the protocol should be \just as good as" a trusted host that simply computed f for the participants 17, 4, 27, 8] . This is called the simulatability approach.
Our de nition follows this simulatability approach, extending it to more general abstract speci cations. More closely related papers that also extend this approach beyond function evaluation are discussed in Section 2.
What does Cryptography Gain from Abstractions?
So far we have argued why formal methods could bene t from cryptographic semantics. Cryptographers ask the reverse question: Aren't our mathematically rigorous proofs better than any abstraction? I.e., why have an upper layer in Figure 2 at all? The answer is that indeed one does not gain expressiveness and the overall results cannot get more rigorous than done by hand, but the speci cations can get nicer, the proofs shorter, and tool support would be easier for those parts of proofs that are accessible to it. Indeed cryptographic de nitions are very long (that in Section 1.2 is one of the simplest), and many have been found faulty or at least have been strengthened later. Similarly, most proofs are currently actually sketches, and again some have contained gaps. This will get much worse with larger systems. 6
Formal Methods without Abstraction
Another research direction is to try and express actual cryptographic de nitions in formal languages. This is almost orthogonal to our own goal, which is to provide a class of abstractions with a general cryptographic semantics. I.e., you can have both abstracted and non-abstracted de nitions in either normal mathematical or formal languages. For instance, 20] (modeling security in CSP) and 21] contain such aspects, or, from another direction 40]. More recent examples are 37, 22] . Note, however, that most approaches in this eld either do not capture the entire real cryptographic de nition (e.g., only de ne that many traces should be compatible with the adversary's view, but nothing about the probabilities), or that only the system model is formal, while the probabilistic part is still a special new semantics in normal mathematical language. Moreover, there is so far not much tool support in this area, in contrast to Section 1.1.
Yet another approach is to add details like homomorphic properties of low-level cryptographic primitives (pure RSA is not at all a secure encryption system in the cryptographic sense) to the abstract data types from Section 1.1, as initiated in 13]. However, there is then still an initial-algebra semantics for the properties one has not added, which so far has no cryptographic justication.
Reactive Simulatability De nition
As mentioned above, a main hindrance for making abstract security proofs that are faithful with respect to real cryptographic implementations is that there is no general notion in cryptography yet for the security of an arbitrary protocol if secrecy is involved. We will provide this for one class of specications by extending the simulatability de nition from function evaluation to general reactive systems.
Related Work and New Aspects in Our Approach
The rst sketch of a simulatability de nition for general reactive systems was given in 16] (Section 6). In 15] (Section 4.1), and also 14], where such a model was rst applied to a concrete protocol, the authors interpret this as including the exact simulation of an internal state. In contrast, we concentrate on comparison of the interface behaviour, i.e., on possible external observations of the system. This was rst sketched in 34] (presented in 30, 35] ). A similar sketch can be found in 9]. Speci c de nitions in a similar setting were worked out in 5,38,10], i.e., they also rely on simulatability, but are \hand-made" for one speci c speci cation. Furthermore, due to the speci c protocol class considered, not all problems of the general case occur.
Detailed general de nitions rst exist in 19, 22] . The former are not for 7 completely general speci cations (straight-line programs)|the main goal was to present a general technique to construct secure protocols for any permitted speci cation|and only for information-theoretic security (in that case, the simpler user model in that paper is probably equivalent to ours below). Also our timing will be di erent. In 22,23], a simulatability de nition was given with -calculus processes instead of the usual interactive probabilistic Turing machines. Unfortunately none of the prior literature (not even the well-known papers on simulatability for function evaluation from Section 1.4) was cited. While having merits as the rst worked-out version with general reactive systems, and the rst with a formal language as machine model, the actual denition, indistinguishability of two views, seems standard to us and not within the formal system. Moreover, the speci cations lack abstraction. For instance, the speci cation of secure transmission of a message in 22] consists of the protocol, only all encrypted messages are replaced by random messages encrypted with the same cryptosystem. In contrast, we aim at speci cations that are considerably simpler than the actual protocols and protocol-independent.
The main novelties of our model are our separate treatment of machines, honest users, and adversaries (this is already in 34]); a precise synchronous execution model for this case; and easy inclusion of various trust models. Further novelties in our work are:
We have theorems relating several variants of the de nition, trying to sort out which design decisions really change the expressiveness. A composition theorem, see Section 4. A strategy to deal abstractly with certain non-cryptographic imperfections of most implementations, e.g., the possibility of tra c analysis. Serious-sized examples fully worked out within a general model (see Section 3). Our current de nitions are in a synchronous model of time. This can be seen as a restriction compared with asynchronous models, and indeed we rst did this to avoid the issue of scheduling between adversary and honest users, which is also not fully worked out in any other model we are aware of. (Of course this should be future work.) However, we believe that a synchronous model is not just a weaker version of an asynchronous one, but any de nitions should be made for both. One reason is that there are many synchronous protocols around because one can often gain e ciency in a synchronous model. Secondly, most asynchronous protocols at least need a possibility for user timeouts in reality anyway. Thirdly, if one entirely abstracts from timing (e.g., by assuming that the adversary does it all), one cannot discover certain information leakage resulting from timing. In this sense, a synchronous model that imposes strict timing requirements on correct machines, and includes observations of reaction speeds with respect to this scale, is closer to reality.
We also do not cover dynamic corruptions at the moment. Each multicast connection contains at least one port from M. s is a subset of the free ports of G, i.e., those that do not occur in M. These free ports are denoted free(G; M). This is illustrated together with the following de nition in Figure 3 . Typically, a cryptographic system is described by an intended structure, and the actual structures are derived using a trust model. E.g., in a multi-party protocol with honest majority any k > n=2 of the intended machines may be present in M (the others are subsumed by the adversary), or in a fair exchange protocol the notary and either of the two exchanging parties. Similarly, the actual channels are derived from the intended ones, depending on whether the intended channels are private, private and authentic, broadcast etc. We have concrete derivation rules for all these standard trust models, but as one can imagine a wide range of trust models we made the above de nition generic.
De nition 2.2 (Con guration) A con guration of a cryptographic system
Sys is a tuple (M; G; s; H; A; G AH ) where (M; G; s) 2 Sys is a structure, A and H are machines modeling the adversary and the honest users, and G AH is an additional graph with connections only between A and H. A and H should use all ports from free(G; M), and no ports of A and H should remain free (both w.l.o.g.).
Typically, all ports from s are attached to H and all other ports from free(G; M) to A, i.e., the honest users use precisely the speci ed ports and the adversary the rest, e.g., wiretaps. We could actually require this for all cryptographic examples we have considered so far, but not for all examples from fault-tolerance. 7 We nd this model with speci c honest users much 6 Thus there are internal channels among machines from M and connections between M and an environment. Multicast is modeled by several edges from the same output port.
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more intuitive than prior models without: Honest users should not be modeled as part of the machines in M because they are arbitrary, while the machines have prescribed programs. For example, they may have arbitrary strategies which message to input next to the system after certain outputs. They may also be in uenced in these choices by the adversary, e.g., in chosen-message attacks on a signature scheme; therefore the graph G AH . Honest users are not a natural part of the adversary either because they are supposed to be protected from the adversary. In particular, they may have secrets, and we want to de ne that the adversary learns nothing about those except what he learns \legitimately" from the system (this depends on the speci cation) or what the user tells him directly (via the graph G AH ).
We can show that several di erent versions of the following de nition are equivalent (see 32]), but we have not found one that does not need a distinction between speci ed ports s and other free ports.
For a con guration, we de ne probability spaces on the runs (or executions, or traces). This would be standard for PEFS machines, except for the fact that adversaries and users cannot be expected to be synchronized with the system rounds. For the adversaries, this is the well-known model of \rushing adversaries"; for users, it is new. As a worst case, one might have to de ne that adversaries and honest users carry out an arbitrary dialogue within each round, but we can show that this is equivalent to our following simpler model.
De nition 2.3 (Runs and Views) Given a con guration conf and an initial input for each machine, a probability space of runs is de ned as follows:
Each round i has four subrounds, and the switching order is MH ?A?H ?A. This means that in Subround i:1, the machines from M and H switch, in Subround i:2 the adversary A, etc. The network transports messages according to the graph between any two subrounds; if H or A input two messages per round on a channel to M, M receives their concatenation.
The view of any subset N of the machines can be described by their initial inputs, the random values they used and the messages they received. It is a random variable in the space of the runs and written as view conf ;in (N), where in denotes the initial inputs. The family of these random variables indexed by in is called view conf (N). to our simpler de nition. In the following, we need the cryptographic de nition of indistinguishability of families of random variables, see, e.g., 18]. Perfect indistinguishability is simply equality; computational indistinguishability is quite similar to the de nition of asymmetric encryption: The adversary is given an element from one of the families and should not be able to guess which one.
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For simplicity, we also assume that the initial inputs of all machines are only a security parameter k. The following de nition is illustrated in b) We say that Sys 1 is computationally at least as secure as Sys 2 i the same as in a) holds for polynomial-time users and adversaries, and with computational indistinguishability of the families of views instead of equality. Typically, Sys 1 is a \real" system and Sys 2 an \ideal" system used as a speci cation. Formally, we make no special requirements on ideal systems, but often each of their structures contains only one machine (called \ideal host" in cryptography), while the real system is distributed.
The fact that users H that use ports from free(G 2 ; M 2 )?s 2 are excluded is where the distinction of users and adversary makes a real di erence. It means that the ideal system may have channels to the adversary and thus make certain events visible or manipulatable in an abstract way that are not visible to normal users. This allows us to model systems with certain accepted, a-priori known vulnerabilities, which is important in practice. If we would allow H access there, these exact events would have to be indistinguishable from some events in the real system, which would seriously limit the possible abstraction. This should become clear in the following example. 9 
Examples and Accepted Vulnerabilities
We have so far worked out two examples in this model in full detail, a protocol for computationally secure (private and authentic) message transmission and one for optimistic certi ed mail. The former is similar to examples already considered with a simulatability approach (but not in a general model), the latter is new. Both consider an arbitrary number of participants that can run many instances of the basic protocol, because only then typical protocol failures show up. In both cases we have a protocol-independent speci cation, and then a proof for one speci c protocol.
We can only sketch the rst example here to show how our de nition with honest users permits easy and truly abstract speci cations, in particular in connection with accepted vulnerabilities as one often nds them in real-world applications. (See 33] for the second example.)
The nicest abstract model for secure message transmission would be one machine that models a perfect network, i.e., users can input messages with addresses, and the messages are delivered precisely to these addresses in the same order. However (as also observed, e.g., in 1]), this would not allow implementations by normal use of encryption, even perfect encryption with one-time pads, unless one also hides the tra c patterns by constantly sending encrypted meaningless messages (\link encryption"), which wastes too much bandwidth for most applications.
Interestingly, not even link encryption with one-time pads on authentic channels (to avoid destruction of messages) is as secure as this \nicest" ideal system in the synchronous model: In the real system, a message between two honest participants is rst switched by the sender's machine, then the recipient's machine. The ideal system must represent the same delay. However, an adversary to whom a message is addressed (i.e., he can decrypt it), can obtain it without the delay of his own machine and send an answer back in the same way. Thus the answer arrives two rounds earlier than it would in the nicest ideal system. This is one of the subtleties of the synchronous model mentioned in Section 2.1 that might be abstracted away in an asynchronous model, but indicates a possible problem with timing in real life. (One cannot Additionally, it has four ports for the adversary. adv in 0 and adv out 0 are for sending and receiving messages, while busy 0 and suppress 0 correspond to the imperfection of the tra c: In busy 0 , the adversary gets one bit of information for each message is transit, and with suppress 0 he can suppress it (modeling that cryptography cannot guarantee availability).
We model that in each round i > 0, each participant can send one message to each other participant. Hence in each round i, the ideal host IH accepts Here in i (h; ) is the vector of inputs at port in(h), and intuitively in i (h; l) is the message user h wants to send to user l in this round. We use for \no message". The switching function is, for h; l 2 H and a 2 A: 10 Having free ports in the graph G, instead of simply leaving some ports of IH free, may seem strange here. But in a few examples, the structures speci cally o er multicast connections to their environment. The matrices busy i and adv out i are output at the corresponding adversary ports, and each vector out i ( ; l) at port out(l).
Note how normal messages have a delay of one round, while messages to and from the adversary have not, and that \busy" and \suppress" are just 1-bit signals for each message, i.e., as abstract as possible.
We can now see why we have to distinguish the speci ed ports s, and to forbid H to use ports from free(G 2 ; M 2 ) ? s 2 in the simulatability de nition:
We do not want the real system to have ports busy and suppress. Instead, it will have normal channels where encrypted messages will pass. Hence, while we require that the events at the user ports in(h) and out(h) are simulated indistinguishably, we do not require this for the ports busy and suppress. This becomes even more important in a larger example like our certi ed mail example, where, e.g., one \busy" signal per protocol run is enough, i.e., we do not even need one per message. This simpli es the abstract speci cation and enables it to be protocol-independent. (Recall the alternative in 22] mentioned in Section 2.1.)
Scheme 1 (Real message transmission, sketch) In the actual system Sys MT 1 that we prove to be as secure as the ideal system, there is one machine M l per intended user l, and all are connected by point-to-point channels. The actual structures (for any subset H of honest participants) are derived with a standard trust model with insecure channels, except that authentic channels are needed for key exchange (only used in Round 0): Only the machines M h with h 2 H are present in M, the insecure channels are split into one channel to and one from the adversary, and the authentic channels get the adversary as an additional recipient.
In each round i > 0 (after initial key generation and exchange), each correct machine M h transforms its user inputs in i (h; l) into network messages of the following form: netw i (h; l) 8 < :
E l (h; sign h (in i (h; l); i; l)) if in i (h; l) 6 = , else. E denotes encryption as before, and sign signing, including the message in clear. The comma denotes tuple composition, not concatenation, and the implementation must guarantee unambiguous decomposition. We can prove that this system is as secure as the ideal system Sys MT 2 if the encryption system and the signature system are secure under their normal cryptographic de nitions, in particular the one shown in Section 1.2. Omitting any parameter from the network messages, e.g., the outer h, makes the protocol insecure. But of course, quite di erent protocols may be as secure as the same ideal system.
Composition
One of the main advantages of our model is a composition theorem. We will brie y sketch what we mean by this and its relation to formal methods. 11 Consider the example of secure message transmission. The ideal system Sys MT 2 contains no probabilism at all, to say nothing of encryption operations etc. It is a very simple, non-distributed system. If a larger protocol Sys prot 1 makes use of secure message transmission, we therefore want to design it assuming that the message transmission is done by the ideal system Sys MT 2 . If the protocol uses cryptography in no other form, we can therefore design it without any probabilism etc., and thus hopefully in a simple language and even with the support of standard tools. Hence Sys MT 2 plays the role of an abstract primitive in Figure 2 . Now the larger protocol will also have some speci cation; we call this Sys prot 2 . It corresponds to the abstract goals in Figure 2 . This is shown in Figure 6 . Although we also wrote the right part with \ ", denoting \at least as secure as", we would hope that the proof does not involve any arguments with probabilities etc. because both systems are deterministic; hence it should be accessible to formal proof methods.
What the composition theorem gives us is the left part: The real higher protocol using the real secure message transmission system must be as secure as its design that used the speci cation of the message transmission system. Of course, the theorem does this generally, not only for message transmission on the lower layer. Moreover, \ " is indeed transitive, as suggested in the gure. The theorem can be extended to the composition of several systems, and parallel composition is a special case.
Another theorem that we have actually proven is a kind of right part of Figure 2 for the case where the abstract goals are not a speci cation by an ideal system, but by linear-time logical expressions over the speci ed ports: If a system Sys 2 ful ls such requirements, and Sys 1 is as secure as Sys 2 (with respect to a mapping that keeps the speci ed ports constant) then so does Sys 1 , in a well-de ned notion of computationally ful lling linear-time formulas.
Relation to Formal Methods
The main relations to formal methods were already sketched in Section 4: Our current speci cations of abstract ideal hosts are mathematically rigorous, but informal. However, they clearly lend themselves to a range of normal speci cation techniques. Then the composition theorem shows ways how to prove larger systems secure without much special attention to the speci c cryptographic semantics.
Our abstractions in the two large examples are on a rather high layer, e.g., we did not present an abstract model of encryption, but immediately of secure message transmission. It will certainly be interesting to see how much lower one can get or to what extent current cryptographic protocols have to be and can be redesigned to use only the abstract primitives that do have a cryptographic semantics. Here combinations with some of the less abstract formalizations mentioned above will certainly be interesting.
